This paper introduces Bishop's constructive mathematics, which can be regarded as the constructive core of mathematics and whose theorems can be translated into many formal systems of computable analysis. The real numbers are presented using a set of constructive axioms, from which are derived some elementary properties of the real line R, including its completeness.
What is constructive mathematics?
In this paper we outline some of the main features of modem constructive mathematics, in the hope that we may convince our colleagues interested in all aspects of ?omputability in analysis that, by examining the analysis developed by Errett Bishop and his followers -an analysis that is, in practice, based on logical, rather than overtly algorithmic, considerations -they can find a rich source of material for implementation within their models of computation.
Many mathematicians believe that what distinguishes constructive mathematicians
from the practitioners of traditional, or classical, mathematics (that which is taught in most university courses) is a distrust of such principles as the law of excluded middle (LEM) and the axiom of choice. In fact, the original motivation for constructive mathematics, according to pioneers of the subject such as Brouwer [ 1 l] and Bishop [2] , is a positive one: a desire to interpret existence strictly in terms of computability, or constructivity, a desire which happens to lead, for good reasons, to that distrust.
We concentrate on Errett Bishop's approach to constructive mathematics (BISH), which originated in 1967 with the publication of the book Foundations of Constructive Analysis [2] , in which Bishop developed large parts of classical and modem analysis within a strictly constructive framework. His development was based on a primitive, unspecified notion of algorithm and on the properties of the natural numbers:
The primary concern of mathematics is number, and this means the positive integers. We feel about number the way Kant felt about space. The positive integers and their arithmetic are presupposed by the very nature of our intelligence and, we are tempted to believe, by the very nature of intelligence in general. The development of the positive integers from the primitive concept of the unit, the concept of adjoining a unit, and the process of mathematical induction carries complete conviction. In the words of Kronecker, the positive integers were created by God.
[2> P. 21
Although Bishop has been criticised for being too vague in his concept of algorithm, by this very vagueness he left open the possibility of interpreting his work within a variety of formal systems. Not only is every theorem of BISH also a theorem of recursive constructive mathematics -which is, roughly, recursive function theory developed with intuitionistic logic -but it is also a theorem of Brouwer's intuitionistic mathematics 1 and, perhaps more significantly, of classical mathematics. This last point is worth emphasising: every proof in BISH is a valid proof in classical mathematics. Moreover, we believe that Bishop's proofs of analytic results can be translated, often routinely, into algorithms within any of the computational models discussed at this
Dagstuhl Seminar on Computability and Complexity in Analysis.
We have already alluded to intuitionistic logic, the logic that is forced upon us when we want to work constructively. An examination of constructive mathematical practice leads us to the following interpretations of the logical connectives and quantifiers. P V Q: we have either a proof of P or a proof of Q.
PA Q: we have a proof of P and a proof of Q. TP: assuming P, we can derive a contradiction (such as 0 = 1). P + Q: we can convert 2 any proof of P into a proof of Q. 3xP(x): there is an algorithm which computes an object x and demonstrates that P(x) holds.
Vx E AP(x):
there is an algorithm which, applied to an object x and a proof that x E A, demonstrates that P(x) holds. Heyting [19] gathered the underlying principles that appeared to follow from these interpretations into the axioms for intuitionistic logic. To recover axioms for classical logic, one need only add to Heyting's intuitionistic axioms the law of excluded middle, ' For more information on the relation between BISH, recursive constructive mathematics, and intuitionistic mathematics, see [S, IO] , or [6] .
* This interpretation of implication, while more natural than the classical one of material implication, in which (P + Q) is equivalent to (4' V Q), has not completely satisfied all researchers using constructive logic. Shortly before he died, Bishop communicated to the author his dissatisfaction with the standard constructive interpretation of implication. Unfortunately, he left nothing more than very rudimentary sketches of his ideas for its improvement. P V lP, whose constructive inadmissibility follows immediately from the interpretation of disjunction given earlier (a matter that we shall clarify shortly). Now, our experience shows that when we do constructive mathematics, we are actually doing mathematics with intuitionistic logic. The desire for algorithmic interpretability forces us to use intuitionistic logic, and that restriction of our logic seems to result, inevitably, in arguments that are entirely algorithmic in character. Maybe this is
Bishop's "secret still on the point of being blabbed" ([2], epigraph): algorithmic mathematics appears to be equivalent to mathematics that uses only intuitionistic logic. If that is the case -and all the evidence of our experience suggests that it is -then we can carry out our mathematics using intuitionistic logic on any reasonably defined mathematical objects, not just some class of "constructive objects". This view of constructive mathematics is essentially that of Richman [24, 25] ; it was also prefigured in [4] .
In order to develop mathematics, and not just logic, constructively, we need objects upon which we can operate. These objects are the natural numbers, already discussed above, together with sets and functions. According to Bishop, A set is not an entity which has an ideal existence: a set exists only when it has been defined. To define a set we prescribe, at least implicitly, what we (the constructing intelligence) must do in order to construct an element of the set, and what we must do to show that two elements of the set are equal. [2, p. 21 Note that it is not required that the property characterising a set be decidable (cf. [l&5]). This is consonant with recursive mathematics, in which not every set is recursive. Note also that equality is defined for each particular set, and must satisfy the usual rules of reflexivity, symmetry, and transitivity. So in order to combine sets using the operations of union and intersection, we need those sets to be given as subsets of some larger set inducing the equality on each of the subsets. In general, Bishop does not deal with intensional equality (identity) of objects. For example, he defines a real number as a sequence (x~) of rational numbers regular, in the sense that that is 1 1 Ixm -x,1<-+m n for all m, n 2 1; he then defines two real numbers (x, ), ( yn ) to be equal if for all n > 1. So he works directly with Cauchy sequences, rather than, as would the classical mathematician, with equivalence classes of Cauchy sequences (cf. the standard practice of identifying the fractions 4 and $ ).
Having dealt with sets, Bishop turns to functions:
in order to define a function from a set A to a set B, we prescribe a finite routine which leads from an element of A to an element of B, and show that equal elements of A give rise to equal elements of B. [2, p. 21
If we omit the requirement that equality be preserved, then we relax the notion of function to that of operation. This notion is rather contentious, and we will avoid further mention of it wherever possible. It is, however, important in Martin-Lof's type-theoretic formalisation of constructive mathematics, which has had a significant impact on the work of computer scientists interested in extracting programs from proofs [21, 12, 17] .
Building on the positive integers, weaving a web of ever more sets and more functions, we get the basic structures of mathematics: the rational number system, the real number system, the euclidean spaces, the complex number system, the algebraic number fields, Hilbert space, the classical groups, and so forth. Within the framework of these structures most mathematics is done. Everything attaches itself to number, and every mathematical statement ultimately expresses the fact that if we perform certain computations within the set of positive integers, we shall get certain results. [2, pp. 2-31. An interesting formal system for Bishop's mathematics, using number, set, and function as primitives, was given by Myhill [23] . The same author has also developed intuitionistic
Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory as a foundation for constructive mathematics [22] . Other foundational systems for BISH are found in [15, 14, 21, 7] . Excellent sources for constructive foundational matters are [ 1,261.
Of course, there are many classical results that we cannot hope to prove constructively; in other words, results that are essentially nonalgorithmic.
To illustrate this point, In words, LPO states that for each binary sequence (a,), either a,, = 0 for all n or else there exists n such that a,, = 1. If this principle could be proved constructively, then, applying it to the binary sequence defined by 0 if 2k is a sum of two primes for 2<k<n + 1, a, = 1 otherwise, we would be able either to prove the Goldbach Conjecture -every even integer >2 is a sum of two primes -or else to compute an even integer >2 that is not a sum of two primes. By applying LPO to other well-chosen binary sequences, we would be able to solve, by a decision procedure, a whole host of open problems, including the Riemann Hypothesis. "Of course, such a method . . . does not exist, and nobody expects that one will ever be found" [2, p. 51. We therefore conclude that LPO should not be admitted as a working principle of constructive mathematics, and that any proposition that constructively implies LPO should be regarded as essentially nonconstructive.
In particular, this reinforces the view that the law of excluded middle, of which LPO is a trivial consequence, is nonconstructive.
There are stronger reasons for rejecting LPO in the constructive setting. First, there are so-called Kripke models of arithmetic which show that LPO cannot be derived with intuitionistic logic [26, Ch. 21 . Secondly, the recursive interpretation of LPO is provably false within recursive function theory, even with classical logic (see [ 10, Ch. 31); so if we want BISH to remain consistent with a recursive interpretation, we must not allow LPO to be used therein.
Our rejection of LPO has some significant consequences even at the level of the real number line R. For example, we cannot expect to prove constructively that Another classically trivial consequence of LEM that is not acceptable in BISH is the lesser limited principle of omniscience (LLPO):
For each binary sequence (a,) with at most one term equal to 1, either a2,, = 0 for all n or else azn+l = 0 for all n. Taking the principle of excluded middle from the mathematician would be the same, say, as proscribing the telescope to the astronomer or to the boxer the use of his fists. [20] To end this introductory section, let us look at the role of various axioms of choice in constructive mathematics. We first observe that the full axiom of choice entails LEM [16] , a fact that appears to conflict with Bishop's remark [2, p. 93 that the axiom of choice.. .is not a real source of nonconstructivity in classical mathematics. A choice function exists in constructive mathematics, because a choice is implied by the very meaning of existence.
Now, it is true that if to each element x of a set A there corresponds an element y of set B such that the property P(x, y) holds, then it is implied by the meaning of "existence" in constructive mathematics that there is a finite routine for computing an appropriate y E B from a given x E A; but this computation may depend not only on the value a but also on the information that shows that a belongs to the set A. The computation of the value at a of a function f from A to B would depend only on a,
and not on the proof that a belongs to A; in other words, a function is extensional. So Bishop's remark is correct if he admits "functions" whose value depends on both a and a proof that a E A, but is not correct if, as most constructive practitioners do, one only admits extensional functions.
Note that the axiom of choice will hold constructively if the set A is one for which no computation is necessary to demonstrate that an element belongs to it; Bishop calls such sets basic sets. Most constructivists would regard the set N+ of positive integers as a basic set, a belief that is reflected in the acceptance of the principle of countable choice:
If to each positive integer n there corresponds an element y of a set A such that P(n, y), then there is a function f : N+ + A such that P(n, f (n)) for each n E Nf.
In fact, many constructive proofs use the stronger principle of dependent choice:
If a E A, and to each x E A there corresponds y E A such that P(x, y), then there exists a function f : N+ + A such that f (1) = Q and P( f (n), f (n + 1)) for each nEN*.
Constructive axioms for the real line
We now present a set of axioms for the constructive theory of the real line R, analogous to those given for the classical theory in [ 131. Our axioms are intended to capture the idea that a real number is something that can be arbitrarily closely approximated by rational numbers. (In Bishop's formal construction, referred to above, that approximation is done by means of regular Cauchy sequences of rational numbers. ) It may, at first sight, seem strange to seek a constructive axiomatic presentation of the real line, but there are at least two reasons for wanting to do so. First, there is the possible advantage in teaching a course in constructive mathematics. Experience has convinced us that Bishop's formal constructive development of the real number system, starting with the notion of a regular (Cauchy) sequence of rational numbers, takes more time and effort than one might wish, and is sufficiently tricky for many students as to distract them from the main business of constructive analysis. We believe that it is possible to give a convincing motivation for the axioms presented below, by heuristic arguments based on the informal idea that a real number is something for which we can find (with emphasis on the word "find") arbitrarily close rational approximations.
Our second reason for seeking constructive axioms for the real line is the mathematician's natural curiosity about which properties suffice either to characterise that object or at least to enable one to develop real analysis constructively.
Our starting point is to assume the existence of a set R with We also denote x-' by i or l/x.
It is natural to ask whether, for the existence of x-l, it suffices to have -(x = 0). The answer is provided by a well-known example which shows that the statement The next group of axioms describes several properties of the ordering >.
R2. Basic properties of >:
(1) l(x>y and y>x). The second of these axioms is a substitute for the law of trichotomy, and can be justified heuristically (see [9] ). In connection with axiom R2(3), note that the statement is equivalent to Markov's Principle [lo, Ch. 1, Problem 81.
Our last two axioms describe special properties of > and >, . For the second of these we need to know that the notions bounded above, bounded below, and bounded are defined as in classical mathematics; and that, for example, if S is a nonempty subset of R that is bounded above, then its Ieast upper bound, if it exists, is the unique real number b such that a b is an upper bound of S, and l for each b' <b there exists s E S such that s > b'. (Note that nonempty means what the intuitionists call "inhabited"; that is, we can construct an element of the set in question.)
R3. Special properties of >:
(1) Axiom of Archimedes: For each x E R there exists n E Z such that x <n.
(2) The least-upper-bound principle: Let S be a nonempty subset of R that is bounded above relative to the relation 2, such that for all real numbers ~1, /? with CI <B, either B is an upper bound of S or else there exists s E S with s > X; then S has a least upper bound. The first of these two axioms would seem to require no justification.
The second is a little harder to motivate, but can be justified heuristically using an approximate interval halving argument [9] . Omitting many of the simpler proofs, we now derive some elementary constructive properties of the real line that involve the orderings > and 2.
1. 1(X)X) 2. x3x
(x>yAy>z)=+x>z
Since x > y, either x > z or z > y. The latter is ruled out by axiom R2( 1).
7(x>yAy>x)
If X> y and y>x, then y>y, by definition of 2. This is absurd.
(x>y2z)=sx>z
Either x>z or z > y>z. The latter is ruled out by 4.
(xay>z)+x>z
Use the definition of >,.
-(x>y)WyY3x
If 1(x > y) and x >z, then, by R2(2), y>z. Hence y3x.
For the converse, use 4 above. 
x2>0
Suppose x2 < 0. Then 1(x # 0), by 16 ; so x = 0 and therefore x2 = 0, a contradiction.
Hence 1(x2 ~0) and therefore x2 20.
19. o<x<l*xx22 20. -1<x<1~1(x2>xAx2>-x) Suppose that -1 <x < 1 and that (x2 >x Ax2 > -x). If x> 0, then which contradicts our second assumption. Hence 7(x >O) and therefore x GO.
A similar argument shows that x 80; whence x = 0. But in that case we have -x =x2 = x, again a contradiction.
x2>O+x#O
Either x > 0 or x2 >x. In the latter case, either x2 > -x or -x >x. Suppose --x >x.
Then
x-x>x+x=2x, so 0 > x. Thus we may assume that 2 > x and x2 > -x. Then either x > 0 or 1 > x.
In the latter case, if x > -1, then we contradict 20; so 0 > -1 ax and therefore o>x.
x>o*x-'a0
If O>x-', then 1 =x-'x<x-'0 = 0, a contradiction.
23. Let m,m' be integers, and n,n' positive integers. Then mfn >m'/n' if and only if mnt > m'n.
This is an exercise in algebra, starting from the fact that 1 > 0.
24. If nEN+, then n-'>O. 25 . If x> 0 and ~30, then there exists n E Z such that nx > y.
Using axiom R3( 1 ), choose n E Z such that n >n-' y. Then nx > (x-' y)x = y 2 0, so n>O.
x>O+x-'>O
Using axiom R3( l), choose n E Z such that n >x. Then n > 0 and so, by axiom R2(5), nx>O. Suppose that x-l <n-l; then by R2 (5),
a contradiction. Hence x-l an-' >O, and therefore x-l >O.
xy>O+(x#OAy#O) Since
we see that x + y # 0. Without loss of generality, take x + y > 0. Then either x > 0 or y >O. Taking, for example, the first case, since X-' > 0 we have y=x-'(xy)>x_'o=o.
28. Zf x >O, then there exists n E N+ such that x <n <x + 2.
Choose m E N+ such that x < m. Either x + 1 < m or m <x + 2. In the latter case, we are finished. So we may assume that x + 1~ m and therefore x < m -1. Repeatedly using this procedure, we either reach the desired conclusion or we show that x < 1.
In the latter case, either x + 1 < 1 and therefore x < 0, which is absurd; or, as must be the case, 1 <x + 2.
If a < b, then there exists r E Q such that a <r < b.
First assume that a> 0. Using 25, choose n > 0 such that n(b -a) >2 and therefore na < na + 2 <nb. By the preceding result, there exists m E Nf such that na<m<na+2<nb. Then a<m/n<b, so we can take r=m/n. In the general case, choose n E Z such that -a <n. Then b + n >a + n >O; so, by the first part of the proof, there exists a rational number r' with a + n < r' < b + n. Then r = r' -n is rational and a < r <b.
There is an obvious question relating to our system of axioms for R: is it categorical?
In other words, are any two models of these axioms isomorphic? The answer is perhaps at first sight surprising: there are nonisomorphic models of the axioms. For example, the Dedekind reals satisfy all our axioms and a stronger form of the least-upper-bound principle, and so provide a model that is not isomorphic to the one obtained by Bishop's construction of R using regular sequences of rational numbers (see [26, pp. 270-2771 ).
The completeness of R
We now deal with some consequences of the least-upper-bound principle that will lead us to a proof of the Cauchy-sequence completeness of R.
A set S is said to be l finitely enumerable if there exist a natural number n and a mapping of { 1,. . . , n} onto S; l jinite if there exist a natural number n and a oneeone mapping of { 1,. . . , n} onto S. In the first case we also say that S has at most n elements, and in the second that S has (exactly) n elements.
The statement
Every finitely enumerable subset of R is finite entails LPO: given a binary sequence (a,), consider the finitely enumerable set Lemma 1. Zf S is a jinitely enumerable subset of R, then sups and inf S exist.
Proof. Let S = {xi , . . . ,x,}. Given real numbers cc,/I with a </I, we apply axiom R2 (2) n times to prove that either xk <p for each k or else there exists j such that Xj > c(. Axiom R3(2) now shows that sups exists. The proof for inf S is similar. 0 Let S be a subset of R. By an E-approximation to S we mean a subset F of S such that for each x E S there exists y E F with Ix-y] <E. We say that S is totally bounded if for each E >O there exists a finite s-approximation to S. It is an exercise to show that a set is totally bounded if (and clearly only if) for each a>0 it contains a finitely enumerable s-approximation.
Proposition 1. Zf S is a totally bounded subset of R, then sups and inf S exist.
Proof. Let l convergent if there exists a real number 1, called the limit of (x,), such that for each E > 0 there exists N such that Ixn -11~ E for all n > N.
We aim to prove the converse of the easily established result that a convergent sequence in R is a Cauchy sequence. exists.
